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Drawing on an integrated mixed methods research design, we explore the dynamics of the development-
conflict nexus in rural Indonesia, and the specific role of development projects in shaping the nature, 
extent, and trajectories of ‘everyday’ conflicts, especially those generated by the projects themselves.  We 
find that projects that give inadequate attention to dispute resolution mechanisms in many cases stimulate 
local conflict, by injecting development resources themselves or less directly by exacerbating pre-existing 
tensions in target communities.  Projects that have explicit and accessible procedures for managing 
disputes arising from the development process, however, are much less likely to lead to violent outcomes.  
We argue that such projects are more successful in addressing project-related conflicts because they 
establish direct procedures (such as forums, facilitators and complaints mechanisms) for dealing with 
tensions as they arise.  These direct mechanisms are less successful in addressing broader social tensions 
elicited by, or external to, the development process.   
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Diverse groups hold together because they practice politics—not because they agree about 
‘fundamentals’, or some such concept too vague, too personal, or too divine ever to do the 
job of politics for it.  The moral consensus of a free state is not something mysteriously 
prior to or above politics: it is the activity (the civilizing activity) of politics itself. 
 




A long-standing branch of social and political theory argues that economic progress and social 
conflict are closely intertwined; indeed, that the latter is often a constituent element of the 
former.  While some astute scholars of the development process have recently sought to remind 
us that “violence and prosperity” (Bates 2000) essentially go hand in hand, the prevailing policy 
wisdom (e.g., World Bank 2003) continues to assert that sustained conflict in low-income 
countries is primarily a product of ethnic diversity, acts of greed or grievance, weak institutions, 
low social cohesion or simply poverty itself.  Prescribed policy solutions come from a menu of 
structural fixes, ranging from “pro-poor” economic growth, building the rule of law, and 
redressing inequalities between groups, to enhancing the security sector, enforcing property 
rights, promoting judicial reform and improving the quality of service delivery.   
We are surely in favor of all of these efforts and recognize the problems they are trying to 
address.  Such interventions themselves, however, also have the potential to inflame rather than 
dampen conflict by changing social and political structures, power relations, rules systems, and 
resource allocations between classes and occupational groups (Moore 1966).  Even the 
introduction of new nation-wide democratic decision-making procedures and supporting 
institutions (e.g., a free press, judicial reform) can be accompanied by violence (Snyder 2000).   
This is also true at the sub-national and project level.  Conflicts can obviously stem from 
controversial development policies (e.g., forced resettlement) and project failure (e.g., 
incompetence or malfeasance), but even putatively ‘successful’ policies and projects that spur 
economic growth or local development inevitably create—via Schumpeterian processes of 
“creative destruction”—‘winners’ and ‘losers’ and can fan the flames of latent inter-group 
tensions, in so doing generating or contributing to violent unrest that undermines the basis and 
impacts of such growth.  The resources, rules and incentives that development projects and 
policies introduce thereby help shape the structural and relational contexts in which conflict 
becomes more or less likely to arise and/or to escalate.  In this sense, the development process is 
thus one of managing the complex dialectical processes of change (and/or resistance to change) 
characterizing the ways in which particular societies, states and economies change.  
While there is now a unifying scholarly and policy consensus that “institutions matter” 
for ensuring equitable development outcomes in general and ‘managing’ conflict in particular, 
there is far less certainty regarding how to actually build them.  If the most effective and 
equitable political and legal institutions have emerged historically through a process of 
protracted political struggle (thereby imbuing them with a legitimacy, content and durability that 
they may never have been acquired otherwise), then importing the institutional designs of 
‘mature’ western states to ‘fragile’ or ‘transitional’ developing world contexts is unlikely to 
                                                 
1 Crick (1962: 24), cited in Hirschman (1994).   3
succeed (Carothers 2006).  An alternative (if ultimately complementary) lens through which to 
view the development-conflict nexus is needed in order to craft interventions that are attuned to 
the complex dynamics of conflict trajectories and the contexts in which they play out, and that 
can help support the building of inclusive spaces for deliberation wherein context-specific 
institutions—and the civic skills and political sensibilities on which their content, legitimacy and 
durability rests—can be conceived and implemented. 
This study is set in Indonesia, a country in the midst of negotiating a triple transition—
from military autocracy to multi-party democracy, from centralized to decentralized government, 
from economic boom to crisis to uneven recovery—that has, at times, been accompanied by 
violence.
2  In addition to outbreaks in a number of locations of large-scale and violent communal 
or secessionist conflict, widespread (and often violent) local conflict has occurred across the 
country.
3  These multiple transitions have generated numerous political challenges relating to the 
management of individual and group identities, to collective decision-making and accountability, 
to citizens’ and policymakers’ expectations and aspirations, and to the reform of old—and 
creation of new—institutions.  The fact that multiple multi-directional processes of social change 
were going on, varying in form and impact in different places, led us to use a sampling strategy 
of carefully matched ‘program’ and non-program’ areas in order to enable us to more carefully 
distinguish between project impacts and those stemming from broader processes of transition. 
Drawing on an innovative mixed methods research design, we sought to assess the 
particular role of development projects in both producing and (possibly) mitigating ‘everyday’ 
conflicts in rural Indonesia, with the specific goal of identifying the conditions under which 
different types of development projects can be either part of the problem of local conflict 
escalation or, more constructively, part of a solution to mitigating it.  The study focused on how 
the Government of Indonesia’s (Word Bank-financed) Kecamatan Development Project (KDP), 
which is present in 40% of villages across Indonesia
4, interacted with local contexts and conflict 
dynamics, and how it influenced participants’ capacity to respond to them.
5  By ‘local’ conflict 
we mean disputes (violent and non-violent) that play out at the local level, within and between 
villages or groups of villages usually associated with particular sub-districts.   
KDP is one of the world’s largest participatory development projects, and, unusually for 
the World Bank, is explicitly designed on the basis of social (as opposed to economic) theory.  
Its most pragmatic goal is to deliver key development resources to rural communities, a task that 
was especially vital in the immediate aftermath of the Asian financial crisis (when KDP came 
                                                 
2 There is now a wide literature on these transitions; useful accounts include Schwartz (1999), Bertrand (2004), 
Rieffel (2004) and Robison and Hadiz (2004).  See also Sidel (2006). 
3 Local conflicts tend to have fewer casualties associated with single incidents of conflict than more major outbreaks 
of conflict, and its effects tend to be concentrated at lower levels of geographic specification.  The conflicts in our 
research areas related to issues such as land ownership and use, local politics and administrative issues, domestic 
violence and vigilante killings. 
4 The Government of Indonesia has, at the time of writing (September 2006), just announced plans to scale-up KDP 
and its urban sister project (UPP – Urban Poverty Program) so that it covers all 70,000 villages in Indonesia.  It 
plans to put US$ 1 billion of government resources through the program every year. 
5 The fullest expression of the results of this study are presented in Barron, Diprose and Woolcock (2006), though 
many other papers drawing on different aspects of the empirical data have also been prepared (these are available at 
www.conflictanddevelopment,org).  As the title of the paper suggests, the specific results presented here focus on 
identifying the conditions under which development projects (and related government policy responses) have helped 
or hindered local conflict mediation during Indonesia’s recent period of major social transition.   4
into being), when the livelihoods of millions of Indonesians were threatened and when the 
credibility of both the World Bank (undermined by its close association with the Suharto 
government—Guggenheim 2006) and successive post-Suharto governments were at stake.   
Crucially, however, KDP sought to deliver these resources via inclusive, transparent and 
accountable decision-making mechanisms designed on the basis of extensive prior social 
research in Indonesia; these mechanisms sought to establish new (but context-appropriate) 
precedents and procedures for ‘re-imagining’ (cf. Anderson 1983) ‘proto-democratic’ state-
society relations, and the civic skills and sensibilities on which such a relationship rests.  In 
short, KDP’s unique ‘processes’ are as important as the ‘products’ it delivers; as such, 
assessments of the efficacy of these processes are of importance not only to Indonesia, but to 
other countries in the midst of negotiating contentious transitions, and, more broadly, to all 
scholars and practitioners concerned with responding more constructively to imperatives to 
enhance “good governance” and build “effective institutions”.
6 
The paper proceeds as follows.  Section two outlines some of the theoretical contours of 
the development-conflict nexus, and examines why conflict is so often misunderstood by the 
international community.  Section three builds on this analysis to propose some specific 
hypotheses regarding the conditions under which development projects might be part of the 
problem of inflaming local conflict or, potentially, part of a solution.  Section four summarizes 
the methodology and range of data sources employed to examine the veracity of these 
hypotheses.  The next two sections present the key results (section five on projects as ‘problem’; 
section six on projects as partial ‘solution’).  Section seven explores the implications of these 
findings for development and conflict theory, research, and policy.  Section eight concludes. 
 
2. The Development-Conflict Nexus 
 
Over the last decades, the international development community has shown a renewed interest in 
the issue of conflict, as an item of both empirical study and policy concern, i.e., as a ‘problem’ to 
be addressed and whose unhappy consequences must be reduced and redressed.  Much of this 
stems from the recognition of a number of truths which had previously received scant attention 
                                                 
6 Our relationship with KDP and the World Bank warrants a brief note.  None of the authors were involved in the 
design or implementation of KDP.  At the time of the study, two were consultants hired by the World Bank to 
conduct this research and the third was a member of the Bank’s research department (whose mandate it is, in part, to 
help provide objective and comprehensive assessments of project and policy efficacy).  Some skeptical readers may 
deem this distance insufficient, but we believe these fears to be unfounded, or at least contend that any such 
tendencies are vastly offset by the advantages gained from being in a position that enabled us to (a) secure direct 
access to key stakeholders, documents and participants, and (b) deploy resources at a scale that made a 
comprehensive evaluation of this nature possible.  It is not clear to us that fully “outsourcing” project evaluations to 
consulting firms would yield “more objective” results.  Moreover, third-party funding is, at present, far too small to 
enable other research institutions to conduct an evaluation of this nature at this scale, and even if it was we still 
remain to be convinced that the incentives and biases (in any direction) of external researchers are (or would be) 
qualitatively different to those of anyone else grappling with the World Bank.  We were very conscious from the 
outset of the ambiguities any researcher undertaking this task would face, and actively sought to deploy the usual 
professional procedures and standards to ensure objectivity and validity.  External researchers, for example, were 
consulted at all stages of the design, and (as indicated in the acknowledgements) the results have been presented in 
numerous venues (including those known ex ante to be deeply ambivalent of the Bank’s means and putative 
motives), all with the goal of seeking to ensure that the methodology and ensuing results were as robust as possible.  
See Rao and Ibanez (2005) for a related mixed-methods evaluation of a participatory World Bank project done by 
similarly-placed researchers.   5
but which early failures of the post-colonial and (more recently) the post-socialist development 
effort exposed all too clearly.
7 
First, in an increasing number of cases, early development ‘wins’ in terms of accelerated 
economic growth were undercut by outbreaks of social unrest.  It became clear that destructive 
conflict could set back, by decades, hard-won social and economic development gains.  In El 
Salvador, Sierra Leone and Kosovo, for example, outbreaks of civil war thwarted the best ideas 
of the development planners.  It became increasingly clear that development investments which 
did not factor in the potential for conflict in the contexts in which they operated could be (and 
indeed were) wasted: what use was there in building a road, renovating a hospital or opening a 
school if the resulting infrastructure was burned down in a violent protest, if doctors would not 
work in the hospital because of security concerns, or if children were too frightened (or being 
lured) by local militia groups to pay much attention to their homework?  This led to the rise of 
the field of ‘conflict studies’ within the development industry.  In the applied academic field, 
large-N datasets were established which investigated the demographic and geographic (that is to 
say, easy to measure) characteristics that made countries more prone to violence
8, giving rise to 
an early warning literature (and industry) that served to help donors identify when particular 
countries were at risk of conflict.  Importantly, these datasets were largely, until recently, cross-
national, investigating variation between states rather than areas within countries.   
Second, the rise of the view of development as being the pursuit of increased ‘freedom’ 
(Sen 1999) provided a basis for mainstreaming consideration of security issues into development 
thinking.  The physical, economic and psychological insecurity that accompanies outbreaks of 
violence—and that lingers long thereafter—negatively impacts on freedom, opportunity and 
choice, the basis of development itself.  This helped give rise to the concept of ‘human security’ 
and, coupled with the rise of human rights approaches (Uvin 2004) and the clear persistence of 
intra-state wars in the aftermath of the Cold War, provided a broad basis for both scholars and 
practitioners to take a more pragmatic interest in conflict. 
Third, it became increasingly clear that not only were development interventions at times 
ineffectual in the face of violent conflict, they were also, in other cases, an actual cause of 
conflict.  One extreme example, carefully documented by Uvin (1998), was the development 
industry’s role in the lead-up to the tragic genocide in Rwanda in 1994.  In the humanitarian 
field, a debate emerged over the political role of interventions and the inability of actors (such as 
the International Red Cross or Medicin San Frontier) to be neutral agents
9.  Recognizing the 
damaging impacts of conflict, aid agencies increasingly tried to design projects that were 
“conflict sensitive” and that would “do no harm” (Anderson 1999).  Over time, as Uvin (2002) 
                                                 
7 The discussion of the literature here focuses on works that have had impact on development practice (e.g., within 
international development agencies) rather than on the full academic literature.  While the latter is wide and diverse 
enough to have made significant theoretical advances, all too often this literature has had little impact on the design 
and implementation of approaches in the field. 
8 Some of the more prominent of these datasets include the Correlates of War studies (COW and COW2) at the 
University of Michigan and Pennsylvania State University (Singer 1990), the Conflict Data Project at the University 
of Uppsala (Wallensteen and Sollenburg 1998), the Major Episodes of Political Violence (MEPV) dataset at the 
University of Maryland (Gurr, Marshall and Khosla 2001), and the Minorities at Risk dataset, utilized by Toft 
(2005) amongst others.  A good summary of these datasets is given at the web-site of the Stockholm International 
Peace Research Institute web-site: www.sipri.org.  Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler’s work has also been highly 
influential (World Bank 2003). 
9 For useful discussions on this point, see Gourevitch (1999), Rieff (2003) and Ignatieff (2004).   6
usefully outlines, paradigms about the linkages between development and conflict changed, from 
early efforts to ensure development projects promoted peace to work on post-reconciliation, 
conflict prevention and the use of human security as an organizing concept for development 
programming. 
These conceptual steps created space for the mainstreaming of conflict considerations 
into development policy and practice.  At the national level, the efforts to establish early warning 
systems and the academic work on identifying variables correlated with conflict began to feed 
into the macro-policymaking of development agencies.  Country assistance strategies, for 
example, could now focus on shaping the social and economic structures (such as poverty, inter- 
and intra- group inequality, unemployment, etc.) that seemed to underpin unrest.  In recent years, 
there have been academic attempts to apply such strategies at the sub-national level, using 
multivariate analysis to explain differences in levels of conflict within countries (Barron, Kaiser 
and Pradhan 2004; Justino 2005).  The identification of principles for how to make interventions 
more conflict sensitive also provided space for consideration at the project level of the links 
between specific projects and outbreaks of community unrest.  Many development agencies now 
have advisors who review projects from a ‘conflict perspective’ in much the same way as 
evaluation of the impacts of projects on the environment and indigenous rights was 
mainstreamed into development practice in earlier decades. 
All this is to be commended.  However, the theoretical and empirical basis for integrating 
understanding of conflict into development practice is still weak, and, we argue, limits evaluation 
of the complexities of the development-conflict nexus.  One reason is that conflict is primarily 
seen (in much, although certainly not all, of the literature, but overwhelmingly in development 
practice) as a problem that can be prevented or mitigated through either policies that change 
underlying structures—e.g., reducing poverty, changing the prevailing ethnic make-up of 
localities—or that can be contained within development projects, through attention to 
distributional issues and other aspects of ‘conflict sensitivity’ in project design and 
implementation.  That violent conflict constitutes a barrier to development should be self-
evident; however, such views inadequately recognize the necessity of non-violent social conflict 
in all countries, but especially developing countries, where poverty and lack of opportunity 
underscore the need for change and where, conversely, otherwise desirable periods of economic 
growth themselves can readily become, as discussed above, a potentially destabilizing force by 
realigning class structures and reshaping the bases of group identity (cf. Moore 1967; Bates 
2000; Bayly 2003).  Events currently unfolding in China, where widespread civic unrest is 
accompanying the more celebrated rates of high economic growth (Muldavin 2006), would seem 
to bear out the wisdom of this thesis.
10  These same processes can also play out at the local level.  
For example, improved employment opportunities for women (e.g., a salaried job in a textile 
factory) are likely to present major challenges to prevailing intra-household dynamics.   
Another reason is that despite the theoretical and methodological diversity of work on 
conflict, only a small portion has significantly influenced development policy and practice.   
Methodologically, there has been an almost exclusive focus on large-scale conflicts 
                                                 
10 As de Tocqueville (1856) astutely noted long ago, “Nothing short of great political genius can save a sovereign 
who undertakes to relieve his subjects after a long period of oppression.  The evils which were endured with 
patience so long as they were inevitable seem intolerable as soon as a hope can be entertained of escaping from 
them.  The abuses which are removed seem to lay bare those which remain, and to render the sense of them more 
acute; the evil has decreased, it is true, but the perception of the evil is more keen...”   7
(‘revolutions’, ‘civil wars’) at the national level using large-scale cross-country datasets, at the 
expense of consideration of local conflicts.
11  A consequence has been the privileging of theories 
of conflict that focus on national-level phenomena
12 and of policy ‘solutions’ that (implicitly if 
not explicitly) privilege technocratic interventions (better constitutions, stronger laws, more 
police).  Similarly, there has been a relative lack of comparative analysis of cases of failure 
(violent outbreaks) and success (i.e., where structural conditions would predict serious problems, 
but where violence did not eventuate and/or was addressed early on) (Ross 1993).  While conflict 
management has become a sub-field of the development enterprise, recent advances in social and 
political theory on the relationship between conflict and development (e.g., Varshney 2002) are 
yet to fully inform the mainstream perspectives (on the means and ends of development) that 
drive contemporary development policy and practice. Even within the contemporary 
‘mainstream’, practical theories and models for understanding when and how conflict can be 
productive (rather than destructive) are still to emerge.   
We construe the development process, and its relationship with conflict, as inherently one 
of multiple, uneven, and contested transitions in social structures, rules systems, and power 
relations; as such, it is necessarily political and can (indeed, too often does) result in violent 
conflict.  In this paper, we focus on the ‘micro-politics’ (King 2004) of these transitions at the 
local level, as they are experienced (welcomed, ignored, resisted) by poor villagers and the elites 
who preside over them through their engagement with development projects.  Gaining an insight 
into such local dynamics can illuminate the two-way process of how states in transition shape 
local environments and how local peoples can constrain, interpret and realize these changes, in 
turn shaping the transition itself and the nature of the new and reformed state institutions and 
social structures which result.  This, we argue, can, in turn, provide vital insights into how 
development actors can support the creation of legitimate and effective institutions to manage the 
intertwined processes of conflict and development. 
 
3. Development Projects as Potentially Part of the Problem and Solution 
 
If our analysis above is correct, it is likely that specific development projects will have 
differential impacts on local conflict and the ability of communities (and the state) to manage it.  
On the one hand, projects—even (or especially) those that seek to ‘empower’ the poor and 
enhance the ‘participation’ of marginalized groups—might be expected to generate tensions, 
given that they provide new resources and decision-making mechanisms which can be used to 
either strengthen, modify or undermine existing local power relations.  At the same time, projects 
may provide spaces and resources, and/or change underlying incentives, in ways that makes 
conflicts less likely to emerge or, when they do, less likely to escalate into broader unrest.   
                                                 
11 The legal anthropology literature, in particular, contains many insights on why local conflicts emerge and escalate 
in a range of developing world contexts (on Indonesia, for example, see Just 2001), but sadly has had little impact on 
those working on conflict and development issues in development agencies.  Moore (2004) presents a particularly 
useful collection of pieces on how particular communities maintain order in the context of perennial conflicts 
surrounding property, common pool resources, leadership, and family dynamics.  Interestingly, this literature is 
increasingly influential in the emerging field of access to justice (for example, Golub 2003, World Bank 2004) but 
conflict units within development institutions have largely remained focused on large-scale conflicts. 
12 This is beginning to change with the rise—at least in some quarters—of the consideration of social variables (such 
as proxies for ‘social capital’) and consideration of different forms of social structure, inter-group and state-society 
relations as being determining factors for development outcomes (see King 2004 for a review).   8
Conflicts—and the means to limit violent conflicts—that stem from development projects may, 
in turn, have effects on the likelihood of non-violent progressive transition taking place.  The key 
question is therefore: under what conditions do development projects generate the former or 
latter set of outcomes? 
The Kecamatan (Sub-District) Development Program (or KDP)—the focus of our 
assessment—aims to introduce transparent, accountable and participatory development planning 
at the village and sub-district level in Indonesia.
13  The program’s defining element entails the 
giving of block grants to committees at the sub-district (kecamatan) level, largely made up of 
non-governmental representatives from and elected by constituent villages.  Groups of villagers 
brainstorm and then prioritize ideas for small things they would like to see funded in their 
village—e.g., the paving of a road, the building of a bridge over a stream, a community center, or 
a saving and loans fund.  Supported by input from technical experts, such as engineers, they then 
submit proposals for funding to the sub-district committee.  The committee evaluates proposals 
for technical and financial feasibility, poverty targeting, likely impact, and sustainability.  At 
least one proposal from each village must be from a women’s group.  All deliberative processes 
are conducted in public, and all outcomes are posted on community bulletin boards, with 
journalists and NGOs encouraged to report any abuses. 
KDP thus introduces, or tries to introduce, rules-based, transparent and accountable 
competition into village life.  In the process, it creates “winners” and “losers”—some proposals 
get funded, some do not—and thus the potential for conflict.  However, it also creates new 
spaces for public deliberation, new avenues for the participation of marginalized groups, and 
new opportunities for the cultivation of civic skills: public participation in planning, debating 
difference, managing meetings, keeping records.  Do these new spaces, avenues, and civic skills 
help villagers find constructive resolutions to project and/or non-project related disputes?  Or 
does the program worsen tensions and make conflicts more likely?  KDP also introduces rules 
relating to procurement and implementation, aimed at minimizing corruption, while building 
expectations among villagers for transparency and accountability (Woodhouse 2005, 
Guggenheim 2006).  Does increased transparency make program-related conflict less likely, as 
corruption is harder to get away with?  Or does bringing such program ‘malfunctions’ to the 
surface, and creating expectations for community oversight of other village development 
programs, trigger fresh conflict?  In short, can projects like KDP be part of a solution to 
managing local conflict (i.e. channeling conflict in productive ways), or, like too many other 
development initiatives, is it part of the problem? 
KDP may have direct or indirect impacts on local conflict and its management; these may 
be positive or negative.  Direct impacts are observable along two dimensions.  First, KDP 
introduces decision-making forums at the sub-village, village, and kecamatan levels.  In these 
                                                 
13 Indonesia has a five-tiered system of governmental administration.  Below the national level, there are around 40 
provinces (the exact number changes from year to year, because of a process of provincial splitting that has been 
common since decentralization was introduced in Laws 22 and 25/1999, which were eventually implemented in 
2001).  Below this are over 400 kabupaten (districts) to which many powers have been devolved post-
decentralization.  On Java (one of our research areas), an average district has around one million residents.  In 
eastern-Indonesia, districts are smaller: the districts in Nusa Tenggara Timur (our other research area) have, for 
example, between 200,000 and 650,000 people.  Below this is the largely administrative kecamatan (sub-district), 
each of which has around 20-50 villages.  On Java, these can have 50,000-75,000 people; off-Java, 10,000-15,000 is 
the norm.  The bottom tier of government is the desa (village).  While the names of bottom three levels differ for 
urban areas, the system of government is largely the same (Guggenheim 2006).   9
forums, villagers and village representatives meet to prioritize and then vote on which proposals 
should be funded.  These forums can have either positive or negative impacts on local conflict 
and conflict management capacity.  Prior research has found that, in some cases, KDP forums 
have been used to address conflicts that are not related to KDP (Government of Indonesia 2002).  
Given the extent to which the legitimacy and authority of traditional forums were eroded during 
the Soeharto period, we hypothesized at the outset that KDP forums may create a space wherein 
non-KDP related problems could be addressed and (hopefully) solved.  Conversely, the 
introduction of such forums could trigger destructive conflict.  The KDP model explicitly 
introduces competition, and thus contestation, over resources into the development planning 
process.  Poor villagers have all given valuable time to preparing their proposals, but there is 
never enough money to fund all projects.  This can lead to conflicts in the KDP forums, which, if 
not handled adequately, could potentially become violent. 
Second, KDP introduces facilitators at the village and kecamatan (sub-district) level.   
These individuals are tasked with providing information on the process, helping villagers 
identify and prioritize their needs, and ensuring the project process (from the formation of 
proposals, to decisions on their funding and implementation) runs smoothly.  They also play an 
important role in monitoring the program once implementation is underway.  If these project 
facilitators are trusted and viewed as impartial, they may also play a role in mediating non-
project-related conflicts.  There is evidence—for example, from Lampung province in southern 
Sumatra—that KDP facilitators played an important role in helping to calm tensions between the 
migrant Javanese population and local Lampungese after a conflict involving the burning of 
Jepara village (Government of Indonesia 2002).  Facilitators could potentially play such a 
positive role as trusted and respected ‘insiders’ or impartial ‘outsiders’.
14  These facilitators 
could also, however, play a negative role: where they fail to fulfill their role as program 
monitors, to resolve issues arising within their jurisdiction, to report or take action against 
corruption, or where they themselves steal money from the project, they may trigger new 
conflicts or allow existing ones to escalate. 
Development projects both shape and are shaped by the contexts—the social, political 
and economic structures—in which they operate (Mosse 2005).  The resources and rules that 
programs introduce, and the incentives these produce, help shape the structural and relational 
contexts in which conflict becomes more or less likely to arise and/or to escalate.  For its part, 
KDP can and does shape such ‘conflict environments’—i.e., the local societal structures that 
make conflict more or less likely.
15  First, the program can influence the relationships between 
different groups.  In our villages, identity cleavages exist along a number of dimensions, with 
ethnicity, religion, class, and political affiliation being the most prominent (as well as other 
prescribed identities, particularly in areas where there is little variation in ascribed identity).  
Involvement at various stages of the program can improve the relationship of groups, both 
through the demystification of “the other” and through the promotion of forms of collective 
action that operate across groups.  Conversely, the program can reduce social cohesiveness 
                                                 
14 Village facilitators (FD) are selected by vote within the villages they represent; almost all live within the villages 
they represent and thus inevitably play the role of insiders.  In contrast, kecamatan facilitators (FK) are outsiders, in 
that they are appointed by the project bureaucracy, and almost always are placed in areas that they are not from. 
15 At present our model does not take into account forces exogenous to the areas in which we are assessing KDP.  In 
future analysis, we will consider the limitations of KDP in being robust to outside shocks.   10
and/or trust between groups, particularly if the groups who make proposals tend to be formed by 
people with similar attributes (ethnicity and so on). 
Second, the program can lead to behavioral changes and, in doing so, may reshape intra-
group and state-community relations.  An explicit aim of KDP is to build the participation of 
villagers in political and civic life, an important dimension of empowerment (Gibson and 
Woolcock 2005).  Attendance and participation in KDP meetings may help shape norms in ways 
that encourage other forms of local level participation, for example in village government 
meetings.  This can have a positive impact on building the democratic decision-making skills of 
villagers, and this may spill over into an improved ability to manage conflict.
16  On the other 
hand, the dimensions of social and political empowerment that these processes involve may be 
met with resistance from elites.  In addition, raising people’s aspirations and rights-
consciousness (a key element of democratization), without making remedies available to right 
perceived wrongs, may make increased tensions more likely.
17  KDP can also change access to 
decision-making through legitimizing informal leaders and creating better interaction between 
them and the state.  By allowing for the incorporation of local skills and expertise, this may help 
legitimize informal leaders and create more and better interaction between them and the state.
18  
Conversely, in doing so, the program may undermine the authority of formal actors, hence 
weakening conflict management capacity. 
Third, the program can lead to changes in norms.  Violence is not only a symptom of 
conflict but can also be a response to it.  Where norms exist that legitimize violence as a course 
of action and redress, conflict can easily escalate, thus fuelling cycles of violence and 
retribution.
19  KDP emphasizes a collective and inclusive process of decision-making and 
problem solving.  Does the program help people to understand how to solve problems in non-
destructive ways, helping to build an environment where collective and peaceful problem solving 
is the norm?  Alternatively, the program could also result in negative changes in local norms.  If 
the program repeatedly triggers conflicts, this may compound existing norms of punitive 
retribution (i.e., of resorting to violence to solve problems).
20  These different pathways of 
impact are shown in Figure 1. 
The degree to which these effects occur is likely to be a function, in part, of the existing 
context in which the program is operating, and of the ways in which the program is functioning.  
The impacts of KDP (and of other development projects) on conflict, and the extent to which 
                                                 
16 This is the causal chain outlined in the UN Human Development Report (UNDP 2002) and is implicit in the work 
of Varshney (2002).  We are testing this at the micro-level. 
17 Although such change may not be negative in the long run; see discussion below. 
18 As Scott (1998) and others have shown, local knowledge (‘metis’) allows villagers to solve the problems which 
they face.  The New Order state, in its attempts to standardize structures of local government, eroded the role of 
traditional and community leaders (tokoh masyarakat).  KDP, in creating a formal role for such leaders, may allow 
for the incorporation of local knowledge into program and non-program problem-solving, as well as help create the 
synergy between civil society and the state necessary for effective development generally (Woolcock 1998) and 
conflict management in particular. 
19 Stewart (2005) with reference to other authors argues that violence begets violence, and that it is one of the most 
salient predictors of further violence and conflict escalation.  This of course makes de-escalating conflicts more 
difficult.  
20 The research found numerous examples of areas where violence is the norm for solving certain kinds of problems.  
Research in other parts of Indonesia has demonstrated the pervasiveness and impacts of vigilante justice killings (see 
Colombjin 2002 and 2005; Abidin 2005; Welsh 2006).   11
these various processes take place, are likely to depend on context-specific factors.
21  These 
variable factors will be both endogenous and exogenous to the program.  Endogenous factors 
will include the performance of program facilitators and staff, and elite involvement in the 
program.
22  Collectively, these factors determine the degree to which the program is functioning 
as intended (what we call ‘program functionality’).  Exogenous factors will include those related 
to the general pre-existing ‘capacity’ in the area (e.g., the quality of local governance) as well as 
those that originate outside the local area (e.g., interventions from national politicians, population 
flows, etc.).  We call such factors ‘context capacity’.  Together, we posit that these contextual 
factors will help determine the extent to which KDP has positive and/or negative impacts on 
conflict and conflict management capacity. 
 
Figure 1: Direct and Indirect Impacts of Projects on Conflict and Conflict Environments 
 
Testing these various hypotheses, and seeking to disentangle the many (often competing) 
factors influencing the performance of a large participatory project like KDP, obviously presents 
numerous methodological and logistical challenges.  In the next section, we outline the strategy 
                                                 
21 This is particularly true for transaction-intensive programs such as KDP, where local actors have a certain degree 
of autonomy in decision-making (see Pritchett and Woolcock 2004, and Whiteside, Woolcock, and Briggs 2005). 
22 While we treat elite involvement as being endogenous to the program here, in reality it will in part be a function of 
exogenous factors (e.g., whether a community is accustomed to having high levels of elite involvement in decision-
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we deployed for seeking to address these issues in a comprehensive and rigorous (given the 
nature of the problem and the context) manner.
 
 
4. Overview of Research Contexts and Methodology 
 
Empirically assessing the inter-relationship between KDP and local conflict and conflict 
management was complicated by two factors: the complex dynamic environment in which the 
project operates (which is highly variable, given the geographic scale of the project) and the 
complexity of the project itself.  This required the utilization of a methodological strategy that 
employs a number of different data sources and approaches.  Starting with the view that rigor in 
social research can be properly understood as a function of the fit obtained between the nature of 
the problem and logistical constraints, on the one hand, and the comprehensiveness and quality 
of the evidence, on the other, we constructed a mixed methods research design; our approach is 
akin to that of lawyers who present various pieces of evidence—some ‘exhibits’ are very 
compelling, others less so, still others merely suggestive or circumstantial—in the hope that, 
cumulatively, they add up to a persuasive account. 
 
Further, assessing the efficacy of social development projects is difficult because a 
defining feature of many such projects is the non-standardized ways in which they seek to adapt 
to idiosyncratic local circumstances and, in the process, generate outcomes (such as enhanced 
‘participation’ and ‘inclusion’) that do not have an established or clear metric.  KDP, as we 
outlined in the last section, has numerous moving parts, each of which may interact with the 
local context in different ways in different places.  As a result, we utilized a number of data 
collection and analysis methodologies, with a heavy emphasis on comparative case analysis and 
process tracing (George and Bennett 2005). 
The empirical research underpinning this analysis was conducted in two very different 
Indonesian provinces: East Java and Nusa Tenggara Timur (NTT).
23  Both provinces are 
‘medium-level’ conflict sites, with significant (but not widespread) local conflict.  They vary in 
terms of population size and density, ethnic homogeneity, dominant religious group, proximity to 
national political institutions, and level of economic development.  The rationale for selecting 
such diverse provinces was that if we found similar patterns in very different contexts, it would 
be more likely that these findings held true across other locations (Przeworski and Teune 1970).  
Within each province we chose two districts: one with a ‘high capacity’ to manage conflict; the 
other with ‘lower capacity’.  A detailed site matching strategy was used at multiple levels to 
maximize variation between areas (in terms of cultural and institutional factors, including local 
‘capacity’ to manage conflict) and to allow for comparisons within areas.  Within each district 
we chose three ‘project’ sub-districts which had received KDP, and one matched ‘comparison’ 
sub-district that had not (thereby establishing a plausible counterfactual).  ‘Project’ and 
‘comparison’ locations were matched using propensity score techniques and qualitative 
verification
24; additional treatment locations were chosen to maximize variation within the 
                                                 
23 Full methodological details are provided in Barron, Diprose and Woolcock (2006). 
24 Propensity score matching (PSM) techniques use ‘observed’ variables to help identify, ex post, statistically 
comparable ‘treatment’ and ‘comparison’ groups (see Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983). The obvious identification 
problem stemming from such approaches is that it cannot control for the influence of ‘unobserved’ factors (political   13
sample.  Villages were selected on the basis of the location of “interesting” conflict cases 
identified in the qualitative research, using detailed criteria aimed at making it easier to control 
for non-program effects.
25 
Within each of these settings, a team of twelve researchers and three supervisors 
conducted nine months of qualitative fieldwork in 41 villages.  They developed 68 case studies 
of conflict pathways, which explored the evolution of specific conflicts, some of which became 
violent, others not.
26  The cases covered a wide range of disputes, including land and natural 
resource conflicts (which range from large ethnic conflicts to private conflicts over inheritance), 
cases of vigilante justice (against thieves, witchdoctors, etc.), gang fights, political disputes (e.g., 
over local elections and administrative boundaries), conflict over access to and the management 
of development resources, and domestic and sexual violence.  The researchers also collected rich 
ethnographic material on topics ranging from how local governments function, to local socio-
economic conditions, to the role of traditional and religious leaders, to allow for cross-village 
comparison.  In all, over 800 interviews and 100 focus group discussions were conducted. 
A number of quantitative surveys and data sources were also used.  A key informant 
survey was conducted in the research villages to gather comparable responses to perception 
questions relating to KDP, its effect on conflict, and processes of social change in both ‘project’ 
and ‘comparison’ sites.  A dataset of conflicts as reported in newspapers was created to assess 
patterns and forms of conflict, and variations between areas, a method similar to that applied by 
Varshney (2002) in his work on India, but using newspapers at a lower level of geographic 
specification, with the result that we found impacts from conflict six times that of best previous 
estimates.
27  Two other ‘larger-N’ surveys were analyzed: the Government’s Potensi Desa 
(PODES) survey, which provides information on conflict for all 69,000+ villages in Indonesia; 
and the World Bank’s Governance and Decentralization Survey (GDS).
28 
 
5. When Are Projects Part of the Problem? 
 
A central thesis of this study is that development (and development projects) and conflict 
inevitably go hand in hand.  KDP may have negative impacts on local conflict and conflict 
management capacity, in ways that are direct and/or indirect; the introduction of new resources 
into poor areas, for example, can and has led to heightened inter-group tensions.  Programs like 
KDP, which aim to empower marginalized groups, also introduce new rules and norms about 
decision-making procedures, and, in so doing, impact on local power balances and social 
structures.  Resistance from elites to such changes is another basis for conflict and a common 
                                                                                                                                                             
connections, motivation of leaders, etc) in shaping project selection, a weakness we sought to correct by tapping into 
the local knowledge of our research team: we thus used PSM to identify three “statistically comparable” program 
and comparison sub-districts (kecamatan) and then deferred to the insights of our local research team to narrow this 
down to a more specific and context-specific ‘match’.  The variables used in the PSM process measured: population, 
access to markets, presence of department stores, health and education resources, income, and perceptions of 
poverty level. 
25 See Barron, Diprose, Madden, Smith and Woolcock (2004). 
26 The cases will soon be available on the project web-site: www.conflictanddevelopment.org  
27 The results are published in Barron and Sharpe (2005); Varshney, Panggabean and Tadjoeddin (2004) previously 
used newspaper mapping to map patterns of collective violence in Indonesia. 
28 We do not draw on these latter two sources in this paper.  Future work (including Barron, Diprose and Woolcock 
2006) will make use of these data.   14
form of conflict surrounding KDP in areas where local leaders have traditionally controlled the 
distribution of development resources.  In such areas, power struggles between traditional 
patrons as well as with beneficiaries are not uncommon as KDP helps shift the realm of decision-
making from village elites to villagers themselves.  Transparent processes often manifest 
conflicts as citizens become aware of interference in decision-making processes by the elites.  
Our evidence suggests that KDP and other development projects frequently trigger conflict, or 
interact with existing disputes, in turn leading to conflict escalation.  Importantly, however, we 
find that KDP-related conflicts are far less likely to escalate and/or turn violent than those 
relating to other programs, largely because of the presence of people, spaces and mechanisms to 
deal with conflicts as they arise, and because of the inclusion of a wide range of participants in 
program discussions.  The research found three forms of disputes related to development 
projects, as presented in the Figure 2 below. 
 
Figure 2: Forms of KDP-Related Conflict 
 
 
First, KDP and some other projects introduce competition within and between villages 
over which proposals should be funded; this can and does lead to tensions, in particular when 
groups are disappointed that they did not get a ‘bite of the funding pie’ or when they feel that the 
decision-making process was not transparent or fair.  We describe this form of conflict as in-
built, where the very nature of the program triggers small disputes over the allocation of 
resources through the competitive process.  However, the research also found that, over time, 
groups tend to accept the validity of KDP’s competitive processes and, as a result, the outcomes 
it generates.  Only where the program does not function as intended (e.g., where one group has 
captured the process) do larger problems emerge.  The following statements provide a snapshot 
of some of the views of program beneficiaries towards competition in a range of villages in the 
research sites. 
“When you compare them, I think that KDP is better than P3DT [a different government-funded development project].  
The competitive system can reduce the possibility of ngamlopi [providing money in envelopes] to officials who carry our 
monitoring visits to the field … P3DT always used to provide envelopes to officials who came to the site, but there is 
none in this KDP, the community understands the process.”   15
    Sub-district Head, Slahung, Ponorogo 
“It is normal for people, who feel disappointed because they didn’t get a loan to make threats, ordering the people who 
did receive loans to pay their money back immediately. They will say: ‘seize their processions’. If they don’t repay their 
loans we surely won’t get any more loans. Someone even suggested that they be sent to the police or to jail.” 
Respected Community Figure, Nebe, Talibura, Sikka  
The second form of conflict stems from ‘program malfunctions’.  Malfunctions can stem 
from problems of omission, commission or rational resistance on the parts of villagers or elites.  
Problems of omission are a result of poor public information (‘socialization’) and training for 
program staff, or program implementation; problems of commission stem from deliberate and 
active malfeasance from program staff or local elites (e.g., in cases of corruption); ‘rational 
resistance’ is a product of the incentives (or lack thereof) faced by individuals and/or groups to 
actually follow project procedures (in letter and/or spirit), procedures which may not comport 
with local norms or (if they are elites feeling threatened) their interests.   
Take, for example, a case from Madura, an island off the coast of East Java.  The KDP 
village facilitator thought he had been fired by the Village Head.  However, his term had actually 
come to an end in the KDP cycle, but lack of information and training on program rules meant 
that this was not clear for the facilitator.  Consequently, the KDP village facilitator shifted his 
allegiance to the Village Head’s opponent, which played out in later conflicts in the village 
resulting in property destruction, injury, and wasted development resources.  
“I was only Village Facilitator for five months…  I was terminated by the Village Head without clear reason.  Without 
saying thank you… I was pushed aside because the Village Head was afraid I would ‘straighten out the road’ [criticizing 
the Village Head’s flaws].  I was considered to know a lot about the matter of the assistance, so I had to be pushed aside.  
Perhaps the Village Head was worried that later I would make trouble over the way the project money was used.” 
Former Village Facilitator (FD), Panagguan, Proppo, Pamekasan 
In the example above, there was no deviation in program rules, but poor socialization led 
to confusion, misperceptions, and misinformation that later fueled other village conflicts.  A 
second case from Flores in NTT concerns a dispute over a 2.5km stretch of the Bea Mese–Lando 
road.  Tensions erupted when the proposal from Lando village for KDP to re-surface the road 
was accepted.  The road re-surfacing began as planned, with the first 150m of road completed.  
However, 500m of the remaining road to be re-surfaced lay within Bea Mese village’s 
administrative jurisdiction.  The community there, spurred on by their leaders, started to sabotage 
the stretch already completed, pushing the stones to the side of the road.  They complained that 
they should be involved in the laying of the stones on the road in their region.
29  Meanwhile, the 
villagers from Lando village did not agree because they had already followed the correct 
proposal submission procedures, including the procedures at the meetings at the sub-district 
level.  Why had the villagers from Bea Mese not objected to the project at the inter-village 
meeting? 
Again, the primary reason for the problem was poor socialization of program rules, this 
time at the sub-district level.  With tensions mounting, conflict was only avoided after the 
intervention of the Sub-district Head, the KDP Financial Management Unit Head, and the police.  
The Sub-District Head invited the village heads and other village officials, respected community 
figures, and the KDP staff from the two villages to a meeting to discuss the problem.  After 
discussion, they agreed that the Bea Mese community would be given Rp. 12 million to resurface 
                                                 
29 Female Teacher, Lando, Cibal, Manggarai.   16
the 500m stretch of road located within the administrative boundaries of Desa Bea Mese.
30  It is 
imperative to note here that successfully resolving the problem then required the combined effort 
of both state and non-state actors. 
While the above issues were of primary importance to the villagers involved, what is 
more concerning is problems of commission, with cases of corruption providing a basis for 
larger community unrest.  The field research found many cases where program malfunction 
occurs as a result of intentional deviations from program procedures.  In both provinces, 
numerous cases of corruption of KDP funds led to tensions that were significantly larger than 
those relating to competition within the program itself, often with corruption working hand in 
hand with the elite capture of program, particularly in Manggarai and Pamekasan, our two ‘low 
capacity’ districts.
31   
For example, in Lambaleda sub-district, Manggarai, KDP was suspended after large-scale 
corruption by the sub-district facilitator (FK).  It was discovered that 10% of the budget (Rp. 
59,897,200) had not been distributed.  The FK claimed he would distribute the funds at a later 
date, but this never eventuated and the funds were never seen again.  In total, he is believed to 
have corrupted approximately Rp. 80 million (US8000) in KDP funds, nearly ten years earnings 
of the minimum wage in that region.  However, while he and the program have been suspended, 
he has not yet been punished in the courts and the funds had not been returned at the time the 
research was conducted.
 32  Program functionality, or its opposite, not only contributes to local 
conflicts, but also is an important local context variable that can constrain both development 
processes and outcomes, as well as the likelihood of spillovers into broader conflict management 
capacity in the community. 
A third form, interaction conflict, occurs when development projects (KDP or others) 
interact with pre-existing local tensions, power structures or disputes, triggering conflict 
escalation and, in some cases, violence.  Projects operate in contexts in which power relations are 
constantly being negotiated; as such, development projects constitute a prize resource that can be 
utilized in these struggles.  In certain cases, interaction conflicts involve actors using the project 
for patronage purposes, raising tensions between competing local elites.  In others, elites attempt 
to capture the project for self-enrichment.  Other cases concern the resistance of elites to the 
norms of widespread access to decision-making, transparency, and accountability that KDP 
brings.  Where resistance is greater, there is more potential for conflict. 
Interaction conflicts can be generated in a number of ways.  The money associated with 
projects, which is often vast compared to existing village budgets, can be tapped personally or 
                                                 
30 Villager, Lando, Cibal, Manggarai  ; Village Head, Lando, Cibal, Manggarai; Village Head, Lando, Cibal, 
Manggarai. 
31 Indeed, corruption is a common problem within KDP, as it is with other development programs.  A study of 
corruption in KDP road projects, which looked at the effect of various “interventions” such as increased probability 
of auditing, found that in control locations—that is, locations without any extra audits—29% of funds were 
unaccounted for, some of which was attributable to corruption (Olken 2005).  These figures are high, although it 
should be noted that this was 29% of micro-project funds, rather than of the project’s budget.  However, it should be 
noted this total is still probably lower than for other projects without participatory mechanisms (Guggenheim 2006).  
For example, Mallaby (2004) notes that a similar level (approximately 30%) of World Bank loans in Indonesia, most 
of which were of a top-down nature, were alleged to be corrupted in the years leading up to the financial crisis.  
Indeed, the fact that corruption rises to the surface in KDP can be seen as a positive sign; it means that redress can 
be pursued and this may have deterrent effects for the future. 
32 Chair of Village Community Development Board (LKMD), Golo Mangung, Lambaleda, Manggarai.   17
for the benefit of a person’s family or kinship group.  It can also provide a basis for the 
strengthening or extension of systems of patronage, with development resources being used by 
elites to buy the support of particular individuals or groups in order to build their (the elites’) 
own power.  Positions, such as those of village program facilitator or on the implementation 
team, can also be the subject of political competition.  In such cases, KDP becomes a resource, 
material and/or symbolic, that is fought over.  However, KDP is not the primary cause of the 
conflicts; rather, the program is a trigger that contributes to the escalation of tensions.  A number 
of different forms of interaction conflict can be identified in our data: elite political power battles 
(e.g., through village head elections); control over development resources; resistance from elites 
to democratization. 
In almost every village in our sample, there were cases where development projects had 
become ensnared in local power battles between different elites within the village.  In one sub-
district in Pamekasan, Rp. 1 million (around US$ 100) was taken from the budget for all the 
villages that were successful in obtaining KDP funding.  The money was put towards the 
campaign budget of one of the dominant political parties for the 2004 legislative elections.  A 
case concerning conflict over the development of water resources in East Java intersecting with 
the local village head elections provides another prime example.  In a village in Pamekasan, a 
KDP proposal to provide water facilities in one village was used as a political tool.  The Village 
Head dominated the KDP proposal process to ensure that one of the hamlets where he was 
seeking support in the elections (but which at the time supported his opponent) gained access to a 
water pipeline and hence gave him their patronage.   
“At the time, much of the hamlet community did not support the Village Head … leading up to the Village Head 
election, the Village Head turned the water in the hamlet back on [through a KDP funded project] by connecting PVC 
pipes there to channel water.  In this way, the Village Head obtained the support of the people of the hamlet in the 
Village Head election.” 
Villager, Proppo sub-district, Pamekasan 
 
“I prioritized the clean water project in that hamlet so that their support would come to me [meaning that the citizens of 
that hamlet would support him in the election].  I had already calculated it many days beforehand.  Many villagers of 
the hamlet tended to support my opponent.”  
Village Head, Proppo sub-district, Pamekasan 
 
This led to a heated conflict between election candidates, and the eventual damage of the 
water-pump storage facility.  Implementation of the project was delayed by the Village Head 
until after the election to ensure the hamlet in question voted for him.  Such elite capture resulted 
in a swing in the vote in the target hamlet in his favor, as well as the creation of a new policy by 
the Village Head that the beneficiaries had to pay for access to the water, which should have 
been freely provided as a part of the KDP proposal.  The village ultimately suffered sanctions 
from the program for delayed implementation, and was not able to compete for funds the 
following year. 
Interaction conflict also relates to resistance by elites to the normative frameworks 
provided by projects such as KDP.  KDP is a democratization project; it aims to promote 
transparency and widespread participation in decision-making.  Unsurprisingly, this is often met 
with resistance by incumbent elites who want to maintain the power balance in their favor.  
Many Indonesian villages are still quasi-feudal ‘mini kingdoms’.  In such instances, Village 
Heads and traditional leaders see themselves as playing the role of benign dictators, where they   18
look after the welfare of the people and ensure their security.  The post-1998 democratization, 
and the administrative decentralization that followed, created an environment of flux.  In many 
parts of rural Indonesia, this has led to tensions between the way things were done in the past—
where local village and sub-district elites held the purse strings and were not held accountable by 
villagers—and new normative systems which emphasize widespread autonomy over decision-
making, and checks and balances on forms of political power.  Local culture and custom, and 
appeals to custom and tradition (adat), have been utilized by elites seeking to cling to power.
33  
The clash between two normative worlds, and the resistance of elites to change, can and does 
lead to tensions. 
Elites have the autonomy to capture the KDP process in the way they do other projects; 
whether they do or not is a partial measure of KDP’s efficacy in providing constraints on elite 
power.  If elite roles are significantly different between KDP and non-KDP projects, we can 
assume that KDP is creating incentives for compliance with more participatory and open 
decision-making processes.  In contrast, if the difference in elite involvement is minimal (and 
especially if elite involvement in KDP and non-KDP projects is high) we can assume that there is 
resistance at play; i.e., that elites develop strategies to maintain disproportionate involvement in 
development decision-making and resource distribution. Is conflict then, more likely to result 
from compliance (where elite roles change significantly, and hence decision-making presumably 
becomes more uncertain) or from resistance (where elites try to maintain their disproportionate 
role)? 
Table 1 below shows how changes in elite involvement correlate with the reported extent 
to which KDP forums triggered conflict.  The results show a clear trend for East Java, with sub-
districts with little change in elite involvement considerably more likely to report conflict.  This 
suggests that where resistance to a changed role exists among elites, conflict is more likely.  The 
evidence from NTT is less clear. 
                                                 
33 On a cross-national analysis of the use of culture symbolism as a mechanism for the maintenance of power, see 
Wolf (1999).   19
 
Table 1: Change in Elite Involvement and Level of KDP-triggered Problems/Conflicts 









      Source: Key Informant Survey (treatment sites only) 
 
Both program malfunction and interaction conflicts were also evident in other 
development projects in our research sites.  (In-built conflicts were somewhat rarer, given the 
lack of explicit competition in the design of most other programs).  The follow example 
highlights a drawn out conflict over several years which took place in one village which 
escalated to include actors at the district level and outside the village. It has never been fully 
resolved.  The following is an excerpt from the case study. 
 
In Banyupelle Village, blood, faeces, and refuse from the slaughter of animals at the centrally located abattoir festered and 
rotted, draining into the river nearby.  The river was used by the local people to bathe, wash, and for air wudhu (ritual 
ablutions water) for sholat (ritual prayers).  The community’s long-standing frustration with the impact of the slaughtering 
activities eventually intensified when a comment was made by one of the Kyai (muslim clerics) in his sermons that the river 
water was najis (unclean) so that it could not be used to purify oneself for daily prayers.  The district government made few 
attempts to resolve the problem and ignored the complaints of the villagers.  In 1998, a mob of about 500 people destroyed 
the abattoir, leaving only about ten percent of the abattoir floor remaining.   
 
This incident triggered a series of elite level disputes. Lacking an alternative site, the slaughterers continued killing their 
cattle in the ruins of the roofless abattoir, as much for practical reasons as to make a political statement.  The Village Head, 
renowned for his links to criminal groups, politically opposed the head of the League of Slaughterers group.  While 
discussions about building a new abattoir began, no-one could agree on a location.  The Village Head made a non-
consultative executive decision on the new site, not far from his home, but a long way from the public services required by 
the slaughterers.  Land was purchased at a low price by the Village Head and sold back to the district government for a 
profit.  Construction of the new abattoir began, corners were cut, and rumors circulated about corruption of funds.   
Uncertainty over the construction process annoyed the slaughterers who felt excluded from the decision-making process.  
In the year 2000, the community again expressed their discontent through the destruction of the remaining floor of the old 
abattoir.  The head of the slaughterers eventually built an abattoir on his own property.  While the community was finally 
satisfied, the new public abattoir went unoccupied and elite tensions increased.  Meetings were held to try and resolve the 
problem, but the elites have continued with their own agendas and the problem remains unresolved to date.  Noone uses 
the public abattoir and public funds have been wasted.    
 
The excerpt above demonstrates the intersection between elite interests, conflict, and 
development programs, and the problems that can result from elites power-seeking through 
development processes.  This is a common story of the interaction between development 
programs (both KDP and non-KDP) and conflict, particularly in periods of democratization as 
villagers become more vocal, make more demands, and learn from introduced projects which 
promote transparency. 
However, the key finding from this research was that while there were a variety of 
development programs in the research areas and resulting conflicts, KDP conflicts did not   20
escalate.  Despite the numerous ways in which projects can trigger conflict, we found that KDP-
related conflicts almost never become violent.  There was only one minor violent dispute relating 
to KDP between 2001 and 2003 in the research areas
34; in contrast, there were 36 violent 
disputes related to other government development programs and provision of government 
services (Table 2).  We argue that the difference is largely because (a) KDP projects, by virtue of 
emerging from a process whereby communities define their needs, are less likely to clash with 
local priorities, and hence conflicts are less likely to emerge; and (b) KDP has a battery of in-
built mechanisms (people and procedures) that allow tensions to be addressed as they arise.  
Resolution success rates of KDP-related problems are also very high.  This is in marked contrast 
to many other development projects, which do not have such mechanisms for channeling 
complaints and quickly addressing inevitable conflicts as they arise; as a result, conflicts relating 
to other governmental and non-governmental projects are far more likely to turn violent.  
 
Table 2: Development Conflicts and Their Impacts (2001-2003) 
Type of Program  # Conflicts  # Violent Conflicts  % Violent  # Killed  # Injured 
# Properties 
Damaged 
KDP 42  1  2%  0  2  0 
East Java  10 0  0%  0  0  0 
NTT  32 1  3%  0  2  0 
 
Other Government  713  36  5%  4  38  11 
East Java  619 20 3%  2  23  6 
NTT  94 16  17%  2  15  5 
 
Other Program  19  1  5%  0  1  0 
East Java  17 0  0%  0  0  0 
NTT  2 1  50%  0  1  0 
 
Total  776 38 5%  4  41  11 
  Source: KDP & CCN dataset35 
 
Indeed, KDP in-built forums and facilitators are commonly used for dealing with KDP-
related conflicts/problems: 92% of survey respondents in East Java reported the use of KDP 
forums for addressing KDP-related problems; 96% did so in NTT.
36  Forums at the sub-district 
level were more likely to be used for solving KDP conflicts than those at the village level (95% 
compared to 85%), reflecting the fact that more conflicts emerge at this level.
37  Further, 
respondents reported very high success rates for the forums at solving KDP-related conflicts: 
84.1% of informants in East Java reported that KDP conflicts were successfully solved in KDP 
                                                 
34 The one case that did occur was relatively minor.  It involved a KDP facilitator being beaten up for reporting a 
case of corruption to the police. 
35 The numbers include all conflicts reported in local newspapers in fourteen districts: the four qualitative research 
districts, plus surrounding ones.  See Barron and Sharpe (2005) for more analysis. 
36 Sample sizes: East Java (n = 119; NTT (n = 130). 
37 In East Java, 91.9% reported use at the village level, and 95% use at the sub-district level (sample sizes: 99 and 
20).  In NTT, 96.4% reported use at the village level, and 94.8% at the sub-district level (sample sizes: 111 and 19).   21
forums; 72.1% reported the same in NTT.
38  Facilitators were also cited by more than 50% of 
respondents in both sites as being a source of problem-solving. 
In-built tensions—that is, forms of competition or contention that are part of the KDP 
design—were more likely to be addressed in KDP forums than were any malfunctions associated 
with KDP.  This was particularly true in East Java, where only 21% and 11% of informants 
reported that forums were used to deal with problems relating to KDP staff and corruption, 
respectively.
39  There are a number of reasons for this.  First, competition-related tensions are 
much easier to deal with than those relating to corruption or other malfunctions.  There are few 
avenues of recourse within forums when malfunctions occur, aside from the sanctions that can be 
enacted at the end of the project cycle.  Second, forums are held relatively infrequently following 
the allocation of funding.  Other processes and facilitators need to be accessed for these kinds of 
problems arising from implementation.  Follow-up from leaders and other institutions outside of 
the KDP process, in collaboration with KDP facilitators, were also instrumental in resolving 
some of the larger disputes. 
The research found that many conflicts triggered by development programs are the result 
of program malfunctions and frustrations with processes, with no or weak avenues for recourse.  
KDP has internal mechanisms to deal with these early on, making the escalation of the problems 
less likely.  Other development processes don’t give heed to the importance of incorporating 
complaints mechanisms into program design.  The lack of such planning for the grievances that 
will arise, no matter how well the program operates, can lead to the programs having destructive 
consequences.  For example, if we examine further the case of the burning of the abattoir above, 
there were no avenues of recourse for frustrated villagers, and when they did try to complain 
early on to district officials in the Office of Animal Husbandry, there was no response to allow 
the relocation of the abattoir.  The villagers also complained several times to the Village Head 
who argued it was outside of his authority.  Eventually, the abattoir was burned down by 
aggrieved villagers.   
In summary, development programs can cause conflict, especially when they entail an 
element of competition, and even when they ‘succeed’.  What is more problematic is when 
adequate information is not given on programs, when they are poorly implemented, or worse, 
when there is deliberate malfeasance.  Analysis of the qualitative case studies in the research 
revealed that there is an intrinsic and complex relationship between the effectiveness of 
continued and ongoing information dissemination and the likelihood of conflict.  In general, the 
relationship is positive: increased knowledge of the rules, processes and aims of a program tends 
to limit the number of program malfunction conflicts—the most destructive form of 
development-triggered conflict.  Effective ‘socialization’ ensures that program participants and 
beneficiaries understand the intentions of the program and how the program will be conducted 
and implemented.  Where the aims and/or decision-making mechanisms for development 
projects are not clear, individuals or groups will not see the project processes or outcomes as 
being “fair”.  Rumors, misinformation, political maneuvering, and exclusion of groups with 
                                                 
38 Sample sizes: East Java (n = 119); NTT (n = 129). 
39 Across the two provinces, 88% of survey respondents reported that KDP forums dealt with problems over 
understanding the project, 87% with issues on which project proposals should be discussed at the sub-district level, 
72% with problems relating decisions made at the sub-district forums, and 69% with problems related to 
procurement or implementation.  In contrast, 39% said that forums had dealt with problems relating to KDP staff or 
facilitators, and 33% with issues related to corruption.   22
mandated rights are all, in themselves, triggers and sources of conflict.  Indeed, this is a 
particularly important finding for participatory programs, where the number of people involved 
in decision-making and implementation is much higher than in more centralized or pre-
determined projects.   
Effective dissemination of public information on programs not only allows for good 
program implementation, it can improve accountability and transparency, allow for ongoing 
bottom-up monitoring which can prevent program malfunctions from occurring, and grievances 
from building.  If processes to ensure two-way information flows are in place, when deviations 
do occur, official monitors and program beneficiaries are aware of the channels for recourse and 
upholding accountability and transparency.  Socialization, together with feedback and complaints 
mechanisms, facilitators and forums, widespread participation, and seeking assistance from 
external actors and institutions were found to be central to minimizing development programs as 
a part of the problem. 
 
6. Can Projects be Part of a Solution? 
 
If development projects are sometimes ‘the problem’ with respect to initiating or inflaming pre-
existing local conflict, can they also be part of a ‘solution’?  In the previous section we examined 
the ways in which KDP and other programs stimulate conflict and how KDP effectively 
addresses the conflicts which are directly related to the program.  In this section we extend the 
analysis to focus on the impact of KDP on those local conflicts that are exogenous to the project 
(e.g., conflicts over land, administrative borders, etc).  KDP introduces facilitators and program 
staff, as well as a number of new decision-making and discussion forums; are these people and 
spaces used for managing local conflict outside the KDP process?  If so, under what conditions? 
 
Direct Impacts 
Conflict is common in our research areas.  We recorded 1840 discrete conflict incidents over the 
three-year period in the twelve districts, 591 of which were violent.
40  Conflict in our research 
areas resulted in 275 deaths in the 2001-2003 period, 158 of which were in East Java, 177 in 
NTT.  The death total was highest in 2001 (120 deaths), after which death totals declined (91 
deaths in 2002; 64 in 2003), mirroring broader trends across Indonesia (Varshney, Panggabean 
and Tadjoeddin 2004).  Death totals ranged from four deaths in Ponorogo district (East Java) to 
52 deaths in Manggarai (NTT).
41  While violence is relatively common, and its cumulative 
impacts significant, with a few exceptions most of the violent conflicts remained relatively 
small-scale; 47% of conflict-related deaths in East Java and 38% in NTT were the result of 
conflicts between individuals.
42  How does KDP impact in general on the likelihood of violence 
and in the regions where it operates? 
Figure 3 shows comparative levels of violent conflict in KDP and non-KDP areas for 
East Java and NTT.  The ‘KDP’ bar shows the mean number of violent incidents that took place 
                                                 
40 It should be noted again that we used a wide definition of conflict that includes relatively minor disputes.  We did 
so in order that we could compare conflicts over similar issues but with different outcomes. 
41 Other impacts of violent conflict, such as property damage and injuries, also varied considerably by district and 
did not always correlate with death levels.  See Barron and Sharpe (2005). 
42 The big exception is communal land conflicts in Manggarai.  These conflicts are between groups and have much 
larger impacts each time they occur, with the most serious case in our sample resulting in fifteen deaths.   23
in sub-districts in the years in which they had KDP; the ‘non-KDP’ bar shows the mean number 
of violent incidents in years in which the sub-districts did not have KDP.
43  The mean is of the 
average number of violent conflicts in one year in KDP and non-KDP areas.  In East Java, 
marginally more violent conflict took place in non-KDP areas than in areas with the program 
(with a mean of 1 in the former and 0.92 violent conflicts in the latter).  In NTT, areas with KDP 
reported higher levels of violent conflict (1.04 versus 0.74).
44  If we take all conflict, violent and 
non-violent, similar trends are observable. 
 
Figure 3: Mean # Violent Conflict Incidents per Year per Sub-District 
 in East Java and NTT (2001-2003): KDP and non-KDP Areas 
 
Source: KDP & CCN dataset  
 
While KDP forums, facilitators and complaints mechanisms are used frequently and 
effectively to deal with conflict related to the program, we find little evidence that KDP per se 
                                                 
43 We matched the conflict data by year to whether a sub-district had had KDP in the previous year.  We ‘lagged’ 
that data in order to ensure that the full KDP cycle had finished, a necessary step if we assume that KDP only has a 
significant impact over a full program cycle.  To illustrate, take, for example, a sub-district that received KDP in 
cycle 2 (2000/2001) and cycle 3 (2003/2004), but not in cycle 1 (1999/2000).  The conflicts recorded in Years 2 and 
3 of our conflict data (2002 and 2003) would be included in the ‘KDP’ total.  However, the conflicts in the first year 
(2001) were recorded in the ‘non-KDP’ total because the program had not yet operated in that sub-district at that 
time.  Thus one particular sub-district will contribute towards both the KDP and non-KDP totals unless they 
received the program for at least three years.  If a sub-district had KDP for three years, they would contribute three 
years of data to the KDP sum; if they had the program for two years, they would contribute two years of data to the 
KDP total, and one to the non-KDP total; and so on.  However, once a sub-district had had KDP, all subsequent 
years were counted in the KDP total, as we assume that KDP programmatic effects will hold.  If, for example, a sub-
district had KDP in Year 1 and 2, but not in Year 3, we would still count all three years of conflict data in the KDP 
total.  Doing the analysis this way allows us to factor in for conflicts that took place before the program arrived in an 
area.  If we simply compared KDP and non-KDP areas, these conflicts would bias the comparison. 

















































had a positive impact on conflict at an aggregate level or a direct positive impact on non-project-
related conflict at the local level.  A number of explanations can be posited for this.  First, the 
case studies demonstrated that there needs to be a confluence of a number of different 
phenomena for a dispute or social tension to escalate into violence.
45  The reason most of the 
results are not statistically significant is because of massive variation between districts in terms 
of the prevalence and impacts of conflict.  Second, we would also expect a bias against finding 
lower levels of violent conflict in KDP areas, because KDP is targeted at poor areas.  Previous 
research has shown links, albeit complex ones, between poverty and conflict incidence (Easterly 
and Levine 1997, Addison 1998, Rodrik 1999, Barron, Kaiser and Pradhan 2004).  Given that 
KDP was not randomly assigned, and that we are not controlling for other structural factors, we 
would expect a bias against finding impact in the macro analysis. 
The qualitative research also found that the direct impacts of KDP on conflict 
management are minimal in the first three years of the program.  KDP forums and facilitators are 
rarely used for addressing conflicts unrelated to the program; where they are used, it tends to be 
in an ad hoc manner.  In none of our research locations had KDP been institutionalized as a 
regular (and/or more general) conflict resolution device. 
In East Java, 13% of village informants surveyed, and 20% in NTT, reported that KDP 
forums had been used in their area to solve conflicts not related to the program.
46  In both 
provinces, reported use for non-KDP problems was higher at the sub-district level, where 20% of 
informants reported using KDP in East Java, and 47.4% did so in NTT.
47  However, this is as 
much a function of the way in which the question was asked as an indication of higher use at the 
sub-district level.  Reported rates are higher at the sub-district level because informants at this 
level would know about those times that KDP was used for such purposes across a wider range 
of villages (i.e., all or most in the sub-district) compared to village informants, who reported only 
on forum use in their own village.  Where forums are used for dealing with non-KDP issues, 
evidence from the fieldwork shows that this is more likely to be at the village level. 
The fact that KDP forums are not used regularly for dealing with conflicts unrelated to 
the program is confirmed by the qualitative research.  In almost every village, respondents were 
clear when asked about the extent to which issues not related to KDP were discussed in KDP 
forums: 
“They only talk about KDP during the KDP meetings.” 
Farmer, Magepanda, Nita, Sikka 
 
“The KDP forums aren’t used to discuss other issues outside of KDP.” 
Village Secretary, Tengku Leda, Lambaleda, Manggarai 
 
Where KDP forums are used for addressing non-project conflicts, these most commonly 
relate to other development projects.  Of those who said that forums had been used for this 
purpose, 58.3% in East Java and 36.4% in NTT said the problems had related to other 
development projects.
48  The fieldwork found that this was because there are often few other 
avenues where problems that emerge from government or donor/NGO development projects can 
                                                 
45 We outline a framework for understanding such escalation in Barron, Smith and Woolcock (2004). 
46 Sample sizes: East Java (n = 119); NTT (n = 130). 
47 Although sample sizes are small: East Java (n = 20); NTT (n = 19).   
48 Sample sizes: East Java (n = 24); NTT (n = 33).     25
be taken; most development projects do not have effective complaints mechanisms and 
processes, with KDP providing one of the few appropriate development-process mechanisms 
available for this kind of problem. 
While KDP forums are rarely used for dealing with non-KDP problems, when they are 
used they are usually successful.  In East Java, 62.5% of informants who said that the forums 
dealt with non-KDP problems said that when they were used they were successful; in NTT, 
60.6% reported success.
49  It should be noted that this is a lower success rate than for KDP-
related problems.
50   
The primary reason why KDP forums are not used for solving most kinds of conflict 
unrelated to KDP or development is simple: villagers have other institutions and actors that they 
deem more suitable for these purposes.  In almost all villages, people know where they should 
take a given type of problem/conflict.  Particular people are seen as having the legitimate 
jurisdiction for addressing different types of conflict.  A second reason why KDP forums are 
rarely used for managing non-program conflicts is resistance from both facilitators and local 
leaders for them being used in this way.  In a number of cases, when people would bring up 
problems in the program’s forums that were not related to KDP, facilitators or local government 
would say that the forums were not the correct place to discuss them.  In many instances, 
program facilitators were reluctant to sanction the use of KDP forums for non-project related 
conflict resolution.  This stance, at times, has advantages: facilitators ensure that the project 
remains a neutral space for discussions on social and economic development issues.  Yet it also 
limits the extent to which the mechanism can be used for dealing with more contentious issues. 
As it stands, KDP is thus not an effective mechanism for working directly on non-project 
conflict.  In some ways, this is a good thing—it allows KDP to remain a politically neutral space 
wherein communities can work out their needs and priorities.  Yet, at the same time, there is 
scope for modifying the program to allow it to more effectively manage local conflict.  On those 
(infrequent) occasions when non-project conflicts are addressed through the program, they tend 
to be resolved successfully.  This shows that there is the potential for KDP to play a larger 
mediation role, in particular for development-related disputes.  Improved training for facilitators 
(in particular at the village level), and increasing the discretion of facilitators implementing the 
program (in particular at the sub-district level), would improve this aspect of the program.  At the 




If the direct impacts of KDP on conflict management are small, our evidence suggests that the 
program has considerable (and positive) indirect impacts on the local institutional environment 
in which it operates.  KDP might influence local conflicts indirectly through changing the 
underlying conflict dynamics, i.e., the structures and norms that make conflicts more or less 
likely to arise and/or escalate (see Figure 1 above).  There are three mechanisms or causal 
processes through which this could happen.  First, the introduction of collective decision-making 
processes, that include involvement from different groups, may change the nature and extent of 
                                                 
49 Sample sizes: East Java (n = 24); NTT (n = 33). 
50 84.1% of informants in East Java, and 72.1% in NTT reported that KDP-related conflicts/problems dealt with in 
KDP forums were successfully resolved.   26
inter-group relations.  Second, KDP encourages participation from marginalized groups and 
collective decision-making; this may lead to behavioral changes and, in so doing, may reshape 
the relationship between citizens and the state, and between ordinary villagers and elites.  Third, 
KDP may change norms, attitudes, and expectations regarding how disputes should be resolved.  
We examine these three theses using survey and case data (in both ‘program’ and ‘comparison’ 
sites) in order to isolate program effects from those of broader processes of social change.  We 
use the wealth of data to explore broader questions of the ways in which democratization and 
changes in social structure affect conflict and conflict management. 
KDP is having a positive impact on all three dimensions, and this is helping make areas 
more robust to violent conflict.  We found that across a range of different identity cleavages, 
KDP had helped contribute to improvements in inter-group relations.  Ethnic, religious and class 
relations in NTT province have improved since KDP was introduced, and these changes are 
greater in ‘program’ (treatment) than ‘comparison’ (control) areas.  It is important to underscore 
here that in the eyes of local peoples in NTT these are the three most important identity 
groupings.  For example, in ‘control’ locations 14.9% reported an improvement in relations 
between religious groups compared to 39.1% in ‘treatment’ locations.
51  Further, improvements 
in group relations are growing larger over time.  Villages that have had KDP for four years show, 
in general, greater improvements than those that have had the program for shorter periods.  KDP 
provides a space for different groups to come together to collectively discuss their needs and 
priorities, an opportunity that is rarely afforded them elsewhere (especially at the inter-village 
level).  There is often inter-group involvement in the physical implementation of projects, and  
KDP also facilitates group interaction by improving transportation networks.   
“Competition [in the KDP process] has positive effects … the community in a sub-district can all come together and 
learn the method and process for obtaining assistance.  So they get to know the community out there [meaning the 
communities in other villages].” 
Village Secretary, Panjeng, Jenangan, Ponorogo 
KDP also appears to be effectively renegotiating the relationship between citizens and the 
state at the local level.  The evidence shows that KDP is successfully helping to democratize 
village life.  Marginalized groups (and, in particular, women) are far more likely to take part in 
KDP meetings than in other village government meetings, bearing in mind here that this half the 
proposals considered for funding must be women’s proposals.  Moreover, increased participation 
in KDP appears to be spilling over into other domains of village public life.  Fifty percent more 
villagers reported that more marginalized groups were coming to village meetings in KDP areas 
than in the ‘comparison’ sites.  Three-quarters of all villagers in those villages that had received 
KDP for the longest time (four years) reported that more groups came to village meetings than in 
the past.  Decision-making in village meetings has also become more democratic, and this effect 
is greater in KDP areas than in the ‘comparison’ sites.  Respondents also reported improvements 
in the way communities were dealing with problems: 
“…The community’s democratic maturity following KDP is manifest in the forums found in BPD (village representative 
body) that follow the KDP pattern… They are more mature in dealing with differences of opinion between BPD 
members as well as with the Village Head in conflict resolution… Usually the problem relates to land boundaries, it 
often happens in Padellegan village.  In order to solve the problem, the BPD and the Village Head sit together to 
mediate between the two disputing land owners.  Then the two land owners are truly satisfied with all the resulting 
decisions.” 
                                                 
51 Sample size: comparison (n = 47); program (n = 115).   27
KDP Financial Unit Head, Pasean, Pamekasan 
“Before it [KDP], I never knew that there were so many clever people in the village … perhaps before KDP villagers’ 
potential had never been utilized, so their capabilities had never been evident.” 
Saving and Loans Group Head, Jenangan, Ponorogo 
At present, KDP has been in place for too short a time to establish clear empirical links 
between its positive impacts on inter-group and state-society relations and the abilities of 
communities and the state to effectively manage conflict.  Collectively, however, arguments 
from social theory, examples from other countries, and evidence from our research areas, all 
points towards these factors helping to improve local conflict management capacity.  However, 
our research also shows that KDP alone does not create these profound changes.  Rather, when it 
works well, and in environments favorable to change, KDP interacts with existing processes of 
social and political transformation, acting as a catalyst that legitimizes processes already 
underway.  KDP’s impact, more generally, is highly contingent on implementation effectiveness 
(i.e., the extent to which KDP functions as intended) and local context (in particular, the capacity 
of both the wider district and the more immediate social structures to govern everyday village 
life).  KDP can minimally compensate for poor local governance, but is most effective when it 
complements broader reform initiatives in well-governed districts and villages.  The findings 
suggest potentially fruitful approaches that seek to build state and institutional capacity and 
legitimacy through stimulating demand for improvements in local governance 
 
Context 
As yet we have not examined how the various factors which lead to differential impacts of KDP 
on conflict management capacity interact with different levels of pre-existing conflict 
management capacity.  These are important considerations for projects like KDP, which aim to 
do ‘small development’ on a large scale.  The following discussion explores how different 
program contexts help, in part, to explain variation in KDP performance as well as its influence 
on local conflict and conflict management.  It is important to understand strength and direction of 
each of the different forms of direct and indirect impact are contingent upon the extent to which 
the program functions well, and the capacity of the contexts (village and district) in which it 
works.  Given that program functionality was discussed in previous sections, we will focus here 
on context.   
The capacity present in the local environment—the skills, resources and commitment to 
reform of its public officials—is crucial for determining overall project impact on conflict 
dynamics.  For example, in low capacity environments where KDP is poorly implemented (as a 
result of, say, the inadequate socialization of participants or weak enforcement of program rules), 
KDP can exacerbate local conflict by providing a new resource over which elites (and 
subordinate villagers) compete.  Given that program functionality is more likely to be poor in 
low capacity areas, this finding suggests that particular attention and resources should be directed 
towards improving KDP performance in areas with low capacity.  A well-implemented program 
in a low capacity environment can, however, produce positive outcomes.  Overall though, 
whether KDP is working well or not is more important than the context in which it operates in 
determining the level and direction of impact.  Where program functionality is poor, hardly any 
positive spillover effects are observed, even in high capacity settings. 
‘Capacity’ operates at multiple levels, and can work in multiple (sometimes opposing) 
directions, depending on the form of impact/influence being assessed.  The use and success of   28
KDP mechanisms for addressing conflicts stemming from KDP itself varies considerably 
depending on specific interactions between implementation effectiveness and the overall 
‘district’ and ‘village’ capacity.  The research found that district capacity often plays a primary 
role in determining the extent to which the program is able to manage program-generated 
conflicts.  However, where conflict stems from KDP malfunction, it was found that in areas with 
lower district capacity to manage conflict there was increased use of KDP forums and 
facilitators.  In such cases, the program provides both the initial channels with which to address 
these malfunctions and public information on these processes which at the very least reach the 
sub-district level participants (these mechanisms were more successful where KDP facilitators 
worked with both local leaders and higher level officials to collectively address the issue).  With 
implementation primarily taking place at the village level, the sub-district forums formed an 
‘override’ mechanism which villagers could resort to in low capacity districts, particularly as 
other mechanisms were limited.   
Meanwhile lower village capacity results in less use of KDP mechanisms at the village 
level to manage program malfunctions as, with the village forming their realm of power, elites 
are better able to circumvent complaints amongst their ‘clients’ that stem from deliberate sins of 
commission.  Conversely, we find that local capacity has little effect on the use of KDP forums 
for any disputes that ‘normal’ KDP competition may generate, but it does appear to have a 
positive impact on the likelihood of KDP forums and/or facilitators being used to address 
conflicts stemming from KDP malfunction or malfeasance.  Figure 4 below summarizes the 
research findings on the interaction between direct and indirect impacts, context capacity and 
program functionality.   
Finally, KDP does not displace existing forums for local dispute resolution; indeed, in 
high capacity environments it can serve as a valuable complement, strengthening already well-
functioning institutions, while in low capacity environments it can provide a positive alternative 
to (or substitute for) absent, captured, or dysfunctional forums.  The marginal impacts of a well-
functioning KDP are higher in low capacity areas (because KDP forums need to take on a wider 
range of tasks), though a minimal level of capacity is needed to provide a basic foundation on 
which to build.  On the other hand, indirect impacts are greater in high capacity areas, where 
KDP can facilitate, and act as a catalyst to, ongoing processes of political and social change. 
The contingency of KDP’s performance on the diligence with which it is implemented 
and local context capacity—both of which are considerably heterogeneous—has important 
implications for those who design, implement and assess participatory development projects, 
especially projects seeking to ‘empower’ marginalized groups and/or operate in what are now 
called ‘fragile’ states.  Programs like KDP do not operate in a vacuum.  The success (or failure) 
of programs such as KDP, which aim to promote local level democratization in post-
authoritarian environments, should be measured not on the sole observable impacts of the 
program alone, but on whether or not they effectively support existing processes of change.  An 
obvious implication is the necessity of understanding such processes at various levels: national, 
regional, local.  Strategies will thus differ depending on the environments in which projects 
operate, and these vary even at the micro level.  This suggests that significant discretion must be 
given to local actors to amend project processes based on the particularities of the local context. 
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Figure 4: The Impacts of KDP on Conflict Management in Different Environments 
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* While we noted higher rates of KDP-triggered conflict in high capacity areas, such conflict is much less likely to escalate 
and/or turn violent.  Hence negative impacts are greater in low capacity areas, where program functionality is poor. 
 
7. Implications for Development Theory, Practice, and Research 
The findings presented above explore the multiple ways in which development projects cause or 
trigger new conflicts, and/or interact with existing tensions, as well as the different ways in 
which they can be used (directly and indirectly) to reduce the likelihood of conflicts turning 
violent.  At best, development projects can support existing processes of change, manage the 
tensions generated by the programs themselves, widen participation, and have primarily indirect 
yet positive impacts on conflict management in general.  At worst—particularly poorly 
implemented development programs and those which ignore context, variability, and local 
expertise—can exacerbate tensions, worsen community relations, and even trigger violent 
conflict, all undermining the development process.  Thus, there are a number of implications for: 
how we conceive of the development process; how we measures the impacts of projects and 
policies on these processes; and for the practices of the ‘development enterprise’ itself.   
It is clear that the processes of development and conflict are intrinsically linked and that 
interventions aimed at speeding development or controlling conflict must take account of both 
dimensions.  A central development challenge is building effective government, judicial and 
civic institutions at multiple levels to help manage processes of change accompanied by the very 
economic progress which development programs encourage.  A primary mechanism for doing 
so, we argue, is through stimulating demand for institutional reforms and ‘good governance’ at 
the local level through the direct involvement of beneficiaries in this process.  Projects such as 
KDP, when implemented well, can play a significant role.  Creating and/or supporting spaces for 
deliberation and the involvement of civil society in them is vital to helping stimulate and smooth 
processes of social, political and economic change (Fung and Wright 2003).  Such tasks are a   30
key ingredient in making ‘the everyday state’ (cf. Corbridge et al 2005) in Indonesia—the state 
as encountered by poor and marginalized people—more inclusive, accountable and effective. 
Speaking to these issues is especially important in developing countries like Indonesia, 
where state and civil society does exist (albeit sometimes in an uneven and limited form), and 
where basic institutions are in place.  It is an even more urgent challenge for post-conflict 
settings—in our age of global interactions and communications—there are strong moral 
pressures and political imperatives to ‘intervene’, yet neither theory nor evidence provides much 
guidance as to how this might be done.  In these situations the absence of material resources is 
often not the problem.  Instead, a number of other issues underpin the development challenges: 
uncoordinated programmatic actions together with the technocratic (if usually well-intentioned) 
sensibilities of external ‘experts’ without the involvement of local expertise can undermine the 
impact of even the most well-intentioned programs; short-term superficial fixes may be 
unsustainable, all the while hiding the lack of attention to underlying and multi-faceted 
grievances and doing little to prevent violence re-emerging over the long term; and not 
recognizing the heterogeneity of contexts, needs, and actors across the canvas of programs can 
result in a discontinuity between problem and program solution.  Furthermore, a lack of attention 
to variability of regions, cultures and development ‘problems’ as well as a lack of continuity of 
actors and long-term support to institutions engaged in negotiation and capacity building 
processes can have devastating consequences when programs, projects, or key individuals are 
withdrawn or cease to be engaged in the development process.  Finally, the absence of a coherent 
and accessible theory to guide practice, specifically to help create viable spaces and incentives 
for crafting negotiated, mutually-owned, and enforceable agreements (between individuals, and 
within and between organizations and different levels of government) can mean there is often a 
considerable gap between broad, noble sentiments and a concrete sense of what is to be done, by 
whom, and why. 
The elements of such a theory, our research suggests, should center on understanding 
three key domains of issues, namely (what we call) the ‘rules of the game’, the ‘dynamics of 
difference’ and the ‘efficacy of intermediaries’.  The ‘rules of the game’ refers to the diversity 
and coherence characterizing the prevailing rules systems, and the capacity and legitimacy of 
those presiding over them; the ‘dynamics of difference’ points to the ways in which group 
identities are formed and sustained, and the strategies used by political leaders to (re)define the 
nature of the boundaries and grievances between contending parties; and the ‘efficacy of 
intermediaries’ discusses the conditions under which individuals (and the organizations they 
represent) are willing and able to effectively mediate disputes and sustain outcomes.
52  These 
three dimensions of theory link conflict dynamics with development processes.  Understanding 
their interactions in theory and in practice in a wide variety of contexts will help to ensure that 
program design bridges diverse rule systems (that of the program, the state, and the local 
society), accommodates the highly variable nature of local contexts and the groups within them, 
and promotes sustainability through building legitimate, accessible, inclusive and participatory 
development institutions at the local level.  Uniting these issues is the importance of investing in 
public information and program implementation, particularly in those areas which are likely to 
be the ‘worst performers’.   
                                                 
52 The details of these three domains, and the links between them, are provided in Barron, Smith and Woolcock 
(2004).   31
These empirical results, the mechanisms through which they materialize, and the 
theoretical frameworks to which they give rise, together suggest a number of specific 
recommendations pertinent to the design of current and future development projects, especially 
those using ‘participatory’ approaches to ‘empower’ marginalized groups.  Though space 
precludes providing details here, seven specific recommendations would be: (a) understand the 
conflict-development nexus and its context specificities; (b) ensure programs work as intended: 
continue stressing socialization and monitoring; (c) promote greater understanding of the project 
cycle, focusing on the points within it—competition for funding, opportunities for ‘elite 
capture’—at which conflict is most likely; (d) focus on building effective internal complaints 
mechanisms and avenues of redress; (e) where appropriate, include both formal and informal 
leaders of all the relevant groups in the local context in conflict resolution procedures; (f) pay 
particular attention to the ‘indirect’ channels through which projects can work: social structures, 
and behavioral and normative changes; and (g) consider ways to support the transition of interim 
institutions which local communities support, value, or need into longer term skills, institutions, 
and norms which are enduring beyond the end of the program or project life. 
That is not to say that all projects should try to become arenas for conflict resolution, but 
rather they should build-in mechanisms to manage the tensions they will inevitably generate so 
that they do not escalate or interact with pre-existing tensions in the target regions.  With 
reference to the latter, support can be provided for interim institutions through providing spaces, 
training, and funds to accommodate the initiatives of local peoples to deal with problems as they 
arise, particularly when such institutions are linked to tensions between the development-local 
conflict nexus.  Most often, ad hoc institutions emerge locally during transitions to bridge 
existing structures with new processes and institutions to reduce the kinds of interaction conflicts 
mentioned above.  It is precisely these institutions—those which are a part of the protracted 
struggle—which are often under-resourced, staffed, and skilled, clinging on by a thread but all 
the while enduring based on emerging need and a vacuum of viable alternatives.  The 
development process should not alienate such local initiatives which sit may sit outside program 
structures just because they do not fit into ‘strictly’ interpreted operational guidelines.  Taking 
such a technocratic approach stifles creativity and reduces the likelihood that the program can 
accommodate context and vice versa.  Flexibility in interpretation of program guidelines, which 
refers to the spirit rather than the letter of the program principles, can allow room to support such 
initiatives and interim institutions, even using them as pilots for incremental program 
development in the future.  
Assessing the efficacy of complex social development projects to negotiate new spaces 
and procedures for decision-making in village life requires a diverse set of methodological and 
analytical tools.  While it is important to strive for clearly defined metrics of project success 
(e.g., the economic rate of return achieved by projects delivered through community mechanisms 
versus those provided by external contractors), the very nature of projects such as KDP and the 
key social objectives (‘participation’, ‘empowerment’) towards which they strive belie stringent 
assessment by a single research tool.  Indeed, in these situations it is arguably more fruitful to 
focus on understanding the dynamics of how specific project processes and implementation 
mechanisms interact with local context characteristics rather than seeking (as broader 
institutional imperatives often conspire to do) to reach a grand pronouncement on whether a 
particular project “works”; the non-trivial answer must inherently be, “it depends”.  In this 
context, prevailing assumptions as to what constitutes a ‘rigorous’ project assessment need to be 
significantly expanded.   32
 
8. Conclusions 
Early twenty-first century technologies and resources contain within them enormous potential for 
promoting both great welfare gains (i.e., poverty reduction) and great conflict, precisely because 
of their potential to promote (even require) “great transformations” (Polanyi 1944). The core 
ingredients—financial, technological, and human—needed to provide basic services to poor 
communities and poor countries are (in principle) readily available, and there is an emerging 
consensus on the principles (if not the specific policies) needed to inform sustainable economic 
growth strategies.  What remains inherently “elusive” in this long-standing “quest” (Easterly 
2001), however, is not “better plans”, “smarter people” or “more resources”, but a willingness to 
acknowledge that (a) many of the institutional “solutions” to problems pertaining to social 
change are not knowable ex ante, and that, accordingly, finding them requires qualitatively 
different modes of thinking and acting to those that dominate contemporary policymaking; and 
(b) that fundamental social and political changes are being wrought upon poor communities in 
the name of ‘development’, and that it is these “great transformations”, large and small, that 
drive—as they always have—the potential for enormous conflict.  The challenge ahead is thus 
discerning how best to respond to these enduring twin realities; our evidence—invoking and 
extending a long-standing strand of social and political theory—suggests that a central part of the 
answer lies in crafting legitimate, inclusive and accountable processes of contested deliberation, 
in and through which context-specific institutions may be politically and incrementally forged. 
This study has sought to speak directly to these concerns by assessing whether and how a 
major participatory development project has influenced local conflict trajectories during a critical 
period of re-imagining Indonesia’s political institutions.  In these fragile contexts and moments, 
where villagers are having their first experiences of (nascent) democratic life and beginning to 
acquire the basic civic skills on which democracy’s vitality and legitimacy ultimately depends, it 
matters enormously whether development projects—of all kinds, but especially large ones 
unveiled with great fanfare and hailed as innovative examples for others to emulate—are helping 
or hindering this consolidation.   
Our findings, and the social theory on which they are based, suggest that both options are 
distinctly possible, and indeed are actually occurring; if KDP is far more likely to be part a 
solution than part of the problem, it is because, unlike many of its peers, it explicitly recognizes 
that the development process, whether it fails or (especially) succeeds, fundamentally transforms 
social, economic and political relations, and as such generates conflict.  Constructively mediating 
this conflict, and helping negotiate a relatively peaceful transition from an (in this case) 
authoritarian state to a (hopefully) more inclusive, accountable and accessible one, is likely to 
require a labor-intensive and time-consuming (hence costly) process of face-to-face socialization 
and deliberation.  Attending to these inherently social processes, however, should not be 
regarded as a mere ‘add on’ to prevent conflict, but rather recognized as a central constituent 
element of development itself and thus overtly incorporated into those practices ostensibly 
designed to bring it about. 
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